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ABSTRACT 
~ Germany, structured financial products already account for 6-8% of all assets 
~vested, proving that the market for these products is still very attractive for retail 
mvestors. A question often discussed in this context is whether these products are 
priced fairly. One of the latest contributions in this field is the paper by Rathgeber 
an~ Wang (2011), who analyzed the pricing of credit linked notes (CLNs) in the 
pnmary market. In this paper, we significantly extend the work of Rathgeber and 
Wang (~Oll) and analyze the effect of the 2007-9 financial crisis on the pricing of 
CLNs: specifically, on their pricing in the secondary market. Therefore, we analyze 
the.pricing of ninety CLNs covering 13 555 daily quoted prices. In addition to the 
ffia.Jor finding that CLNs in the secondary market arenot only overpriced but also 
underp · d · N · 'fi antly d nce m many cases, we discover that the overpricing of CL s stgnt c 
ecreased after the financial crisis. 
Keywords: credit linked notes; market pricing; fair value; financial crisis; product life cycle. 
Correspo di n ng author: A. Aathgeber 
Print ISSN 1744-66191 Online ISSN 1755-9
723 
Copyright c 2016 tncislve Aisk Information (JP) Ltmlted 
43 
44 M. Walter et al 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, structured financial products have increased in popularity among 
retail investors. In Germany, they account for 6% to 8% of all invested assets. Even in 
the United States, structured financial products have an annual growth rate of approxi-
mately 30%, although the local market for these products is strongly regulated (Rieger 
2012). To put theserelative figures into absolute terms, the gross sales of structured 
retai1 investment products accounted for €174.2 billion in Europe, US$179.8 billion 
in the Asia-Pacific market and US$65.1 billion in North America in 2010 (J~?~rgensen 
et al 2011). One such structured product is the so-called credit linked note (CLN), 
which allows the issuing bank to securitize its credit risk, particularly concentration 
risks. As explained in Rathgeber and Wang (2011 ), the mechanism of CLN is as fol-
lows: the buyer of the CLN receives payment for the notes only when the reference 
entity, another debtor of the CLN issuer, does not go into default. As a premium for 
taking over the risk, the buyer receives an attractive coupon. In case of the reference 
entities' default, the buyer receives only the recoveryrate of the CLN. Although the 
figures mentioned above show that CLN contracts are very popular for retail investors, 
as they provide the opportunity forahigh coupon payment, they are the subject of con-
troversial discussions in financial research and the public. Therefore, unsurprisingly, 
credit default swaps (CDSs), which are similar to CLNs, were voted Europe's "most 
dangeraus financial product" in 2013 (Greens-European Free Alliance 2013). Qne 
of the rnajor points of criticism of such structured products is their nontransparency 
'th ard · nts W1 ~eg to whether the coupon payments for and the prices of these mstrume 
are farr and adequate compared with the related risk. 
Several studiesexist on the pricing of equity-linked notes, on certificates in general 
and th .. · · of e pncmg of CLNs in particular. In one of the latest studies on the pncmg 
CLNs, Rathgeber and Wang (20 11) found that they are generally overpriced to a I arge 
e~tent in the primary market, ie, on the date of their issue. This major finding was 
Wtdel~ consistent with previous results in the literature. Since issuers of structured 
financtal products are market makers, they participate in almost every transaction and, 
therefore, have the incentive to overprice. Further overpricing tends to increase as 
products become more complex and as markets b~orne Iess transparent. 
~.8 the study by Rathgeber and Wang (2011) primarily focused on the market 
prtcm~ of_~LNs in the primary market, this study airns to apply a similar model to 
t~t mtspncmg of CLNs in the secondary market. Consequently, "mispricing". {~ 
difference between a f: · · 0 erpnclß8 
bu arr pnce and a quoted price) does not only tmply ov ~ J.I t also underpricin f CLN ted l.-un 
o g 0 s, as, particularly in the secondary market, quo 
pnces can fall bei th ~ · h therthe 
fin 'al 0 0 ow e 
1atr value.In our study, in particular we analyze w e 0 • 
anct cnsts of 2007 9 h d ' cial CfiS1S 
revealed th - a an effect on the rnispricing of CLNs. The finaß 
e enormaus complexity and inherent risks of structured financial pro<Jucts· 
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Thus, an investor's behavior may have changed from risk loving and only bounded-
rational to more reflective (reasoned, among others, in a decrease of information 
asymmetry between the issuer and the investor), leaving CLN issuers less space 
for overpricing and inducing a decline in demand for such products. By testing the 
change in mispricing during the financial crisis, we simultaneously test the validity 
of the product life cycle hypothesis for CLN, ie, whether mispricing - in the sense of 
overpricing (which is higher for CLN than for other standard certificates)- decreases 
during the products' lifetime. Therefore, in a first step, we calculate the daily fair 
prices ofthe CLN. In a second step, we compare them with the daily quoted prices 
and track the daily development of price differences . 
. The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide an overview of the existing 
bterature regarding the pricing of structured financial products. We then derive our 
hypotheses and explain the details of the methodology. Next, we explain our valuation 
framework and describe the widespread data sample used for our analyses, which 
contains ninety CLN contracts from the German retail market with a total of 13 555 
historical quoted prices on a daily basis (2008-12), reflecting a significant extension 
ofthe data sample used in Rathgeber and Wang (20 11 ). Basedon our methodology and 
~ ~ sample, we statistically test our hypotheses. In our test, we find statistically 
Slgnificant evidence that the mispricing of CLNs changed during the financial crisis. 
2 LITERATURE 
~g to Fabozzi et al (2007), a CLN is a credit derivative that represents a 
. contract under which the seller sells the credit risk of the reference entity and 
:ves a certain premium from the protection buyer. Regarding the pricing of such 
011 
~ d~v~~es, Rathgeber and Wang (20 11) pointed out that various studies exist 
and~spncmg of equity-linked notes. For example, Chen et al (1990) and Chen 
in tbe s (1990) were the first to find evidence of the overpricing of these products 
the ~ market. Whereas the former focused on overpricing in the primary market, 
in tbe found the first evidence of decreasing overpricing with decreasing maturity 
~ ...... ~ondary market and, thus, for the life cycle hypothesis. Later, these findings 
---wngth · Otber . e Pnmary and secondary markets were transferred to non-US markets by 
B~tudies, such as Wilkens et al (2003) or Gruenbichler and Wohlwend (2005). 
11e fi e (20ll) provided further evidence for the existence of a product life cycle. 
detnan~ that for discount certificates on the German DAX index, the investor's 
a lllaturi 18 driven by tax benefits. Because of the high demand for certificates with 
8lld, tb ty of just over one year, banks anticipate a significant nurober of net sales 
to ~e able to charge higher premiums than for shorter maturities. According 
"bbhigb n and Pearson (2011), some structured financial products are even sold 
average margins, although they have expected negative retums. Stoimenov 
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and Wilkens (2005) provided further evidence for the existence of life cycle effects, 
as banks are net sellers at the beginning of a product's lifetime and net buyers toward 
the end in order to increase the bank's margin. 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011) provided the first comprehensive study on the mis-
pricing of CLNs. Thereby, they focused on the primary market, in other words, on 
the pricing of CLNs on their date of issue. The paper provides evidence that CLN 
products are generally overpriced and further confirms the finding of, for example, 
Benet et al (2006) and Entrop et al (2009) that the coupon rate and the complexity 
of a contract (measured by the number of reference entities, the number of payment 
days and the coupon structure) have a major influence on mispricing. 
To the best of our knowledge, no study is available that has analyzed the pricing 
ofCLNs on the secondary market, as proposed by Rathgeber and Wang (2011) at the 
end of their paper. By analyzing pricing in the CLN secondary market, we are able 
to test whether the results for the primary market are transferable to the secondary 
market. Further, we analyze whether significant differences exist regarding the causes 
of mispricing in the primary and secondary markets. Moreover, we are able to test 
the hypothesis ofthe product Iife cycle for CLNs. 
Of further interest is the question of whether the 2007-9 financial crisis bad an effect 
on the mispricing ofCLNs. This consideration is based on the idea that CLN investors 
~ften act in a risk-loving manner because they invest in a product that promises a~­
tive coupon payments, even though it may contain a complex and nontransparent n~ 
structure, which investors do not know in detail due to for example, asymmetnc 
information between the investor and the issuer. Thus, ~ investor's decisions are 
o~en based on biased or incomplete information. Hens and Rieger (2014) used ~e 
~trcumstance of incorrect beliefs (eg, probability misestimations) or behavioral u~­
tty functions (eg, prospect theory) to explain the utility gain of structured financtal 
P~ucts and, thus, their popularity with retail investors. Breuer et al (2009) found 
eVtdence for such bounded rational behavior in the case of structured financial prod-
uc~s with s~rts betting components, as their popularity can only be explai~ed by the 
ext.stence of mhomogeneous expectations and bounded rational, risk -loving mvest~rs. 
!bts bounded rational behavior may be intensified by very attractive coupons, wbich 
mvestors in structural fi ·a1 . . . 
1
4) howed that. nanct products can recetve. Wojtowtcz (20 s 
for collateralized d b bl' . . d due to . e t o tgauons (CDOs) in general even fatr sprea s are, 
thetr di · ' boßds . _con tions, ~uch larger than fair spreads on similarly rated corporate · 
!b•s 
18 
accompanted by a high sensitivity of these instruments in the case of changes 
m ~e underlying's default probability. Bounded rational behavior may have ended 
dunng the financial crisis when investors became aware of the high risks of structllftd 
financial proo ts F _ .... Hng 
t . uc · or example, tranches for high-yield CDOs were very apv--: .. o mvestors before tb fi . . . . ~t'"" 
al e nanctai cnsts because they assumed that ratmgs rep&---actu default · ks · wiCZ 
ns · Then, this market collapsed during the financial crisis (WOJW 
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2014). Thus, two effects of the financial crisis on the pricing of CLN s are conceivable. 
On the one hand, investors may increasingly be faced with the underlying risks of 
structured financial products (amplified by a stronger regulation) and, hence, consider 
tbem in the course of their investment decisions. On the other band, the demand for 
such products may decrease. Based on theoretical considerations, both effects lead to 
adecrease in overpricing. 
Hence, our research questions are concretized as follows. Are dai1y prices of CLN 
contracts fair and adequate compared with the related risk? If not, what are the reasons 
for the mispricing, and did the financial crisis have an effect on mispricing? Does an 
observable product life cycle exist for CLNs? 
3 HYPOTHESES 
According to Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), asset prices are strongly driven by asym-
metricinfonnation. Consequently, asymmetric information may lead to the mispricing 
offinancial assets. For instance, with a focus on the primary market, Myers and Majluf 
0984) showed that managers have strong incentives to issue overvalued equity in the 
case of infonnation asymmetry. Examining the interdependence of mispricing and 
asyinmetfic information in more detail, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), among many 
others, showed that market makers (in terms of security markets) use mispricing (in 
the ~se .of overpricing) to compensate for the risk of trading with investors that have 
SUperior .information. Another aspect contributing to information asymmetry is the 
::lextty ~f a financial product. Particularly in the case of CLN contracts, it is very 
hic ult for mvestors to estimate the default probabilities of the underlying assets, 
~~can be interpreted as some kind of information asymmetry, too (Rieger 2012). 
by tionally, the information asymmetry and the resu1ting mispricing are amplified 
irNthe fact that CLNs are the only major credit derivative products available to retail 
to es~s. Thus, no adequate position exists in the retail market, making it difficult w:
2
cate a CLN contract (particularly for multi-reference CLNs) (Rathgeber and 
~ Oll). 
In addi. the case tion to the aforementioned general reasons of information asymmetry, in 
ofbank. of ~LNs, we particularly have to deal with information asymmetry in terms 
front tb ~ding. This is reasoned in the circumstance that a CLN contract is, at least 
eissuer's per . A d' Sbarpe (l " specuve, a loan (provided to the reference entity). ccor mg to 
the borrow~; a bank l.e~s more than others about its own custo~er~", eg, ~bout 
lllalionadv characte~sucs. Consequently, the CLN issuer has a stgmficant mfor-
~ antage regardmg the default probabilities compared with the investor, thus 
<200&)~ pos~ibility of mispricing the contract. Further, Wittenberg-Moeman 
des evtdence that loans issued by institutional investors, ie, loans that are 
Journs.l of Credlt Risk 
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typically issued with long maturities, are associated with higher information costs, 
thus leading to an increase of information asymmetry. 
However, although it may be undisputed that markets for structured financial prod-
ucts show high information asymmetry, there is evidence for a decline of information 
asymmetry conceming, for example, a specific product (group) in the course of time. 
For instance, the recent contribution of McLean and Pontiff (2016) shows for the 
case of stock retums that investors Ieam about mispricing from academic publica-
tions, thus implying that (some) stock market anomalies become less anomalous (and 
instead more "normal") after being published. Thereby, the fact that the number of 
academic publications on the pricing of structured financial products has increase.d 
over time is undisputed. For instance, when using the search database "ScienceDt-
rect" and searching for joumal articles using the search items ("structured product" 
AND "pricing"), we obtain an increase of more than 68% regarding the nurober 
of related articles between 2008 and 2012. Additionally, although more difficult 10 
express in numbers, the public coverage regarding structured financial products such 
as CLNs has increased in recent years, too. Therefore, coinciding with McLean and 
Pontiff (2016), we conclude that both academic research and public coverage have 
contributed to a decrease of information asymmetry. Thus, our major hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis Hl: mispricing of CLN s in the German retail market decreases over time. 
Hypothesis H1 is strongly based on the fact that the pricing of CLNs is influenc~ 
by the presence of asymmetric information within the CLN rnarket, and that tbis 
• Cl • • the m ormauon asymmetry generally decreases over time. Now, we want to exanune 
infl~ence of the financial crisis on the mispricing of CLNs. Here, too, we use inf~r­
~~~on ~symme~ as our basic idea and obtain two major inftuences of the financ:e 
cnsts. Ftrst, refemng to the aforementioned development of academic research. 
obtain a strong increase during (respectively, after) the financial crisis. Using the s~ 
databa~ and se~h items as above, we obtain 1096 related articles for the forty-~~ 
year penod covenng 1960 to 2006 and 2219 related articles for the eight-year pen 
covering 2?07 to 2015. Obviously, information asymmetry regarding the gen~ 
~nderstandmg for the pricing of structured financial products decreased, thus ~~~vulg 
tssuers less space to misprice. The second major inßuence of the financial cnsts 00 
information asymmetry is related to regulation aspects above all barlk regulation and 
~nancial regulation. Since the financial crisis financi~ markets in generat and bankS 
~ Parti~ular have.been more strongly supervis~ by federal authorities ( eg, the F~era;. 
fi:an~al Supervtsory Authority for the case of Germany ). This stronger regulatton ° 
anctal markets has had an impact on the market ~or structured financial produclS. 
too For · · b was · mstance, the European Market lnfrastructure Regulation (EMIR), wbic 
developed in late 2009 as a response to the financial crisis, and which came into f()(CC 
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in August 2012, aims to increase the stability of the over-the-counter (afC) deriva-
tives market (which also includes CDSs as hedging for CLNs) and includes reporting 
obligations for arc derivatives, among others. To conclude, both the increased num-
ber of academic contributions after the financial crisis and the stronger regulation of 
financial markets led to (1) an increase in the transparency of the CLN market and 
(2) an increase in investors' awareness regarding the complexity of such products. 
In addition to these two aspects related to a decrease of information asymmetry and, 
thus, to a decrease of mispricing, we assume a third aspect: how the financial crisis 
changed the mispricing of CLN s. During the financial crisis, the demand for structured 
financial products strongly decreased. For instance, the German securitization market 
brokedown from €68.7 billion in 2006 to €7 .7 billion in 2008, implying a decrease of 
approxiJnately 90% (Schilleret al 2009). Similar evidence is provided by Wojtowicz 
(2014), who showed that during the climax of the financial crisis of 2008, the CDO 
marketcollapsed. Even some highly rated CDO tranches lost up to 90% of their value 
and were classified as "junk". Based on logical considerations, two effects could be 
~able. On the one band, one might assume that mainly expert traders remained 
~themarket, while (uninformed) retail investors Ieft the market due to the unknown 
nskexposure. Following Glosten and Milgrom (1985), among many others, a shift 
toward amarket "full of (informed) experts" would imply an increase in overpricing, 
~ the CLN issuer would try to compensate for the risk of insider trading. On the other 
d, the strong decrease in demand might have forced the CLN issuer to price the 
~ more fairly in order to increase demand. 
the ofincon~Iude, as both a decrease and an increase in the mispricing of CLNs due to anctal · · · lllajor cnsts ts conceivable, we expect at least some effect. Thus, our second 
hypothesis is as follows: 
HyPothesis H2· · · · ,; ___ . . . · nuspncmg of CLNs in the Gennan retail market changed after the 
Ullliii.Ctal cnsts of 2007-9. 
Thehypoth Prlcing eses Hl and H2 are related to the temporal development of CLN mis-
lllllllnsi on an aggregated market Ievel, regardless of a specific contract. To extend our 
_, s, we Want to . COotract, depen . ex.am~ne the development of the mispricing of a specific CLN 
w.o (clasel ding on tts tune to maturity. Thereby, the third hypothesis is based on 
1J:-. Y related) research strands 
··lllt, takin . 
tbat the as g up the ~eady discussed strand of information asymmetry, we argue 
'--- ~th etry of mformation between the CLN issuer and the CLN investor 
-~Wl dec · lbattbetender( re~smg maturity. Sharpe (1990) and Berger et al (2005) pointout 
llarketsin ga~d W~th that ~e CLN issuer) has a comparative advantage over public 
~ tegann:g informatton. Consequently, the CLN issuer has an information 
Jfe.~ g the ~eference entities' default risks at the beginning of maturity. 
· · · zetbat this mformation advantage disappears with decreasing maturity, 
mlll of 01'fldlt Risk 
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which is also in line with Longstaff et al (2005), who provide evidence for a lower 
liquidity, ie, higher information asymmetry, of long maturity bonds, and vice versa. 
Thus, due to the decreasing information advantage with decreasing maturity, we 
expect a decrease in mispricing. Rathgeber and Wang (2011) showed that, indirectly 
associated with the idea of asymmetric information, the complexity of the calculation 
of a CLN's fair value strictly increases with the number of payment days and with the 
maturity of a CLN. They outlined that several days may be required to determine the 
fair value for a (complex) CLN product with long maturity. Consequently, a Ionger 
maturity contributes to information asymmetry and with that to higher mispricing. 
Second, we take up the idea of the product life cycle. Among others, Chen and Sears 
(1990), Baule (2011), Henderson and Pearson (2011) and Stoimenov and Wilkens 
(2005) provided evidence for a product life cycle, concluding that, for multiple rea-
sons already pointed out in Section 2, mispricing decreases with decreasing time to 
maturity. 
Considering both lines of reasoning regarding the time to maturity and its predicted 
effect on mispricing, our third hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis H3: mispricings become more significant as the time to maturity 
increases. 
In addition to the three aforementioned main hypotheses that refer to the change 
in mispricing over time, we seek to control for the remaining effects examined by 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011). We also analyze whether the results from their paper are 
valid on both the product's day of issue and over its entire lifetime. 
First, we adopt the notion that the number of reference entities has an effect on the 
mispricing of CLN contracts. Rathgeber and Wang (2011) found that the numbe~ of 
reference entities has a significant effect on mispricing. Among others, this finding 
?wes to ~e fact that the calculation of the fair value for a multiple referenced CL~ 
18 
very difficult. As Hemandez et al (2007) showed for equity-linked notes.' thi 
nontransparency regarding default probabilities (amplified by the aforemenuoned 
~roblem of asymmetric information) and complexity might Iead to the fact that C~N 
tssuers overprice multi-referenced CLN contracts even more than CLN contracts wtth 
only a small number of reference entities. This paper seeks to confirm the results of 
Rathgeber and Wang (2011) using a significantly Iarger data sample: 
Hypothesis H4· mi · · 1 · g 
· spnctngs become more significant as the number of under ytn reference entities increases . 
. Anh alogous to Rathgeber and Wang (2011) our fifth hypothesis refers to the "firSt 
stg t effect" of co . ' . · d bonds 
(Wall . upon payments, which are comparable to eqwty-linke 
ft meter.and Diethelm 2009). The notion behind this security isthat retail investors o en act wtth bounded · ali d thus, 
rauon · ty: they only recognize a high coupon rate an ' 
Journal of Credit Risk 
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the expectation of a high retum instead of the hidden factors behind the high coupon 
mte (eg, underlyings with extremely high risk). Thus, because the size of the coupon 
rate might inftuence the attractiveness of and, with that, the demand forCLN contracts, 
it also affects the significance of the overpricing: 
Hypothesis H5: mispricings become more significant with higher coupon rates. 
The CLN contracts in our data sample alsocoverdifferent coupon structures (rnixed 
and variable). As the complexity of a CLN contract increases with increasing variabil-
ity of payments, we further include the coupon structure (hereafter, coupontype) as an 
additional control variable. The methodology used to test our hypothesis is presented 
hereafter. 
4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Valuation of CLNs 
Since a CLN can be interpreted as a bond with embedded CDSs, the key to the 
valuation of a CLN is to duplicate the CLN cashftow with the help of CDS spreads. 
Hence, in accordance with Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we use the CDS spreads to 
calculate the implied probabilities of default q. Therefore, we impose the same central 
assumptions: namely, that the recovery rate of a senior CDS RECcos is given and 
constant. Further, there are four payment dates of the CDS in one year, each at the end 
of~quaner, whichleads topremiumpaymentdays Tm = {to.25• to.s. to.1s. tt. · · · 'tm} 
unti} maturity in m. In order to achieve probabilities for less than one year, we apply 
a natural cubic spline interpolation as our smoothing method. 
In order to estimate the fair value of a CLN, our firstintermediate goal is to estimate 
the probabilities curve of the implied default probabilities. To do so, based on the 
at . . th 
oremenuoned assumptions, we (1) calculate the expected cashftows CFt,t m e 
first payment year of a one-year CDS and (2) solve the resulting equation for the 
def~ult Probability q. The starting point of our calculation is the one-year CDS from 
:e mvestor's, ie, risk buyer' s, point of view. As payments occur at four payment days, 
~se payment days have to be discounted in order to achieve the present value. By 
domg so, we get (4.1): 
CFt,t(l + ro.2s)-0' 25 + CFt,tO- qll4)(1 + ro.s)-o.s 
+ CFt,t (1- q114)2(1 + ro.7s)-o.7s + CFt,t (1- qtl4)3(1 + rt)-t = 0, (4.1) 
:: CFt,t = -(1- RECcos)qtl4 + 0.25CDSt(l-qtl4), as one-quarter of ~ 
lin ~ CDs spread will be paid on each of the four annual payment days. Thereby, m 
· e ~th Hull and White (2003), the CDS spread CDSt is set in a way that the swap 
1S Pl'iced fairly. 
Journal of Credit Rille 
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Basedon the a priori estimated yield curve of spot rates rt and the CDS spread 
CDS1, the quarterly probability of default q114 = 1 - ,V1 - q1 for a one-year CDS 
can be solved by means of(4.1). As a result, we receive the cumulative probability of 
default for the end of the first year according to ( 4.2): 
(4.2) 
As CDS contracts with different maturities share the same underlying reference 
entity, they should also share the same cumulated probability of default durlog the 
same period. Therefore, we adopt the cumulated default probability qn-t for the 
first year by calculating the quarterly probability of default qn-114 for a CDS with a 
maturity of n years. Next, in line with Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we calculate the 
quarterly probability of default for CDSs with maturities of n years, as long as CDS 
spreads CDSn are available. Analogous to (4.1), we receive 
4n-4 t-1 
L CFn,t n (1- qrk/41!4)(1 + Ttj4)-t14 
t=l k=l 
4n t-1 
+ L CFn,t n (1 - qrk/41!4)(1 + Ttj4)-t/4 = 0, (4.3) 
t=4n-3 k=1 
with 
CFn,t = -(1- RECcos)qrt/4114 + 0.25CDSn(l- qrr/4114) 
representing the cashflow of the CDS with a maturity of n years at the payment ~ate 
t · Further, r l represents the ceiling function of Gauss. Equation (4.3) is appropnate 
to estimate the implied default probabilities qn;4 , as the right-hand sum has already 
been calculated by the past n - 1 applications of (4.3). Thus, (4.3) has solely tobe 
solved for qn/4· The cumulative probability of default is defined recursively as 
qn = (1 - (1- qnj4)4)(1 - qn-1). (4.4) 
In our case, we receive a cumulative probability of default q 
1 
, q2, ... , qn for the ~nd 
of each year. Further, it can be stated that q0 = O, since, due to logical consideratt~n, 
~ default at the date of issue is assumed tobe impossible. In a last step, andin line Wt~ 
athgeber and Wang (2011), we estimate a continuous curve of cumulated defau 
probab~lities by means of eleven data points, which consist of ten implied probabilities 
at t~n dt~erent times of maturity as weil as the origin that we have already calculated. 
In lme _"'
1
th Press et al (2007), we used a natural cubic spline interpolation as ~ur 
smoothing method. This results in a continuous isotonic function of the cumulattve 
probability of default namect Q(t) = s(q q q ) 
Aft 1• 2 .... , n· 
er calculating these probabilities of default we are able to price the CLN as 
the expected discounted cashftow under the martlngale measure Q (see JarroW and 
Journal of Crectit Risk 
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Tumbulll995; Jarrow et al1997). In doing so, the CLN is priced arbitrage free with 
respect to the CDS market (see, in general, Bielecki and Rutkowski 2002).1 
Further, because our analyses also included CLNs with multiple references, we 
consider the asset correlation of the underlying assets. By doing so, we are able to 
model multiple defaults of the reference entities. A detailed description of the calcu-
lation of the default probabilities with multiple reference entities, which extends the 
aforementioned valuation model by enabling the possibility to handle joint defaults, 
is provided by Rathgeber and Wang (2011). 
Our primary goal is to price a CLN with an annual or serni-annual fixed couponrate 
Ct maturing in Tm at a face value of N. 2 The price of issue is P;. Let the date of issue 
be To and the following payment dates be T1, T2 , ••• , Tm. On the basis of the default 
probabilities curve Q (t) derived above, we can estimate the cumulated probability 
of default Q(T1 - To), Q(T2 _ To), ... , Q(Tn- To) accordingly on each of these 
days. 
lf we impose a certain recovery rate RECcLN, the value FV; of the CLN can be 
expressed as 
m 
FV; = L((Cf N(Tt - Tt-d + l~t N)(l- Q(Tt- To)) 
t=l 
)To-Tr (4 5) + RECcLNN(Q(Tt- T0)- Q(Tt-1- To)))(l + rr,-To • · 
~here 11- = Lt Im J is the result of the floor function and rr,-r0 is the risk-adjusted 
~scount rate. The latter is the sum of the risk-free rate and the credit spread of the 
lSSUer . 
. 10 calculate the overpricing, we evaluate the difference between the theoretic~ _fair 
:ce ~i and the price of issue in reality. A positive difference ind~cates ov~rpncmg, 
. d v1ce versa. Further, we can assume the price of issue to be fatr and esumate the 
lffi 1i . 
P c1t recovery rate, which fulfills this assumption: 
RE~mp 
=!!:- L~ 1 (Cf N(Tt Tt 1) + }Jt N)(l- Q(Tt- To))(l + rrr-To)To-Tr. 
"m ) ( )To-Tr L.t=1 N(Q(Tt - To)- Q(Tt-1 - To ) 1 + rrr-To (4_6) 
1 
V:e :u-e aware of the joint-hypothesis problem, implying that the CDS contraets may also be 
lllispnced and th . . . · · of CLNs Nevertheless, 
~oll . ' • us, leading to a biased result regarding the nuspncmg · . bl 
owmg R ( 1 . ffi · · ignore this pro em · ama 991) and most of the studies on capltal market e ctency, we 
tnourstudy 
2 • 
Fora A""-"ed de . . . f . al fCLNs with fioating 
""Uill scnption of the calculation and the specdics of the alt v ue 0 
COUponrates, Please refer to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), as we proceed analogously. 
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The relative price difference and the recovery rate RECimp are two major indicators to 
determine if a CLN product is overpriced. Thus, they will serve as dependent variables 
in our subsequent test. 
4.2 Mispricing of CLNs 
Our primary aim is to analyze the mispricing of CLN in not only the primary market, 
but also the secondary market. Thus, in contrast to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we 
analyzed quoted prices of different CLNs not only at one pointintime (date of issue), 
but also across the time axis. Hence, as we obtained data for different clusters i 
(different CLN contracts) at different pointsintime t, we had two different analysis 
dimensions. As this circumstance implies the threat of aggregation biases (Keane 
and Runkle 1990), we tested our data sarnple for the existence of panel data. Thus, 
we were able to analyze the effects of structurally different CLN contracts on CLN 
mispricing. 
Todetermine whether the data contained fixed or random effects, we tested the panel 
regressions against an unweighted ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. For the 
random effects model, we conducted a Lagrange multiplier test. The central idea of 
this test is to compare the residuals between the time series for one CLN with the 
residuals between the time series of different CLNs. For the fixed effects model, we 
conducted a simple F-test. Therefore, the F-statistic of both regressions are compared. 
Subsequently, we used the Hausman-Wu test to show that the random effects model 
dorninates the fixed effects model for a11 cases analyzed in this paper (except for 
one robustness check). This test analyzes the regression coefficients of the random 
effects model in relation to the regression coefficients of the fixed effects model and 
uses the differences in relation to the standard errors as test statistic. Because the 
Haus man-Wu test showed the existence of random effects within our data sample, 
we used a random effects panel regression model to test our hypotheses regarding the 
mispricing of CLNs. 
To test our hypothesis, in a first step we operationalize the rnispricing of CLNs by 
means of the contract's implicit recoveryrate RECimp,it for a CLN contract i at time 
t · Thereby, according to ( 4.6), the implicit recovery rate is calculated by means of the 
abovementioned multi-borrower Jarrow and TurnbuH model with a given CLN value 
(in this case, the market price) resolved for the recovery r~te. Further, we assumed 
a recovery rate of 40% for the CDS, which served as the basis for the estimation of 
the default probabilities. This is because, according to the Standard North America_n 
C~rporate ~DS Converter Specification (ISDA 2009), the recovery rate of a (fatr 
pnced~ se~o~ CDS is 40%. As the recoveryrate of a CLN (during the course ofthe 
financtal cnsts) was only 8.8%, we can assume that the higher the implicit recovet'Y 
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rate is, the more overpriced the CLN contract is. 3 To put it in other words, in the case 
of an implicit recovery rate of 100%, the CLN contract equals a risk-free investment, 
which a CLN in fact never is. The corresponding panel regression for the base case 
is shown in (4.7): 
with i indexing the different analyzed panels, ie, the different n CLN contracts. The 
parameter r is a variable for the ongoing date in years since April 1, 2008, which is 
the earliest date with a quoted price in our data sample. CR1 is the coupon rate of 
the CLN and MATit is the time to maturity in t in relation to the CLNs' total time 
to maturity. CT1 is the coupontype of the CLN i (with CT; = 0 for fixed coupon 
payments and CT1 = 1 for variable coupon payments), and NoR; is the number of 
reference entities of the CLN i. v1 is the CLN random coefficient. Because we have 
a random effects model, the random coefficient v1 is a random variable with a fixed 
mean and variance. Further, to test the influence of the financial crisis, we conducted 
two random effects panel regressions according to (4.7). The firstadditional panel 
regression covered all points of time t with quoted prices during the financial crisis. 
The second additional panel regression covered all points of time t with quoted prices 
after the financial crisis. 
We further tested the residuals for autocorrelation within the random effects model. 
!herefore, we used a modified Durbin-Watson test according to Bhargava et al (1982) 
m association with Baltagi et al (2003). The test rests on the idea that, in a panel, only 
autocorrelation between the residuals of the time series (length T) of every single 
CLN · . th are accounted for. This circumstance reduces the number of observauons 10 e 
~t place. However, the modified DW statistics, as displayed in ( 4.8), are aggregated 
m the second step over all N CLNs: 
DW _ Ef 1 L;-2(ett- ett-1)2. (4.8) 
mod- N T 2 
Lt=t Lt=l eu 
Due to the special construction of the modified DW statistics, they cannot be ana-
lyzect with the critical values used in time series analysis. For the panel case, critical 
30b 'al .. servin .. . d . the financt cnsts. 
Acconti g empmcal recovery rates was possible for the first tune unng Brothers 
tetail' ng to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), four weeks after the bankroPtcY of LeJuna!l8 S% ' 
mvestors found that the realized recovery rate for a Lerunan-referenced CI:N was · · 
------------------·~ 
56 M. Walter et al 
values are generated that account for this special setting and the random effects (see 
Bhargava 1982). To address the identified autocorrelation, we used a Prais-Winsten 
estimation for the panel data, because this approach does not modify the length of 
the time series. After one iteration, the residual's autocorrelation was reduced to a 
sufficient extent. For the test of heteroscedasticity, we conducted a robust Lagrange 
multiplier test according to Montes-Rojas and Escudero (2010). Following the idea 
of a Lagrange multiplier test, an auxiliary regression model has to be perfmmed, 
testing for a homoscedastic covariance matrix. In this way, the test follows the well-
known idea of the Breusch-Pagan test. However, due to the fact that we observe 
differently distributed error terms for different CLNs (random effects model), the 
homoscedastic covariance matrix (null hypothesis) is constructed in such a way 
that differently distributed error terms for the different CLN contracts exist in the 
covariance matrix. 
In another test for the inftuence of the financial crisis on the mispricing of CLNs, 
we replaced the date Parameter r by a dummy variable for the points of time during 
the crisis (respectively, after the crisis). 
To test the robustness of our results, we tested the panel regressions previou.sly 
shown in ( 4. 7) with altemating CDS recovery rates (8.8% and 60%) for the estimauon 
of the default probabilities. Further, we tested our results in the case of an estimated 
asset correlation equal to o. 
Additionally, we repeated the panel regression shown in ( 4. 7) with the relative 
mispricing ACLN;t as dependent variable. Thereby, .ACLN;
1 
is calculated using (4.9): 
Pt (4.9) ACLNit = FVt - 1, 
~ith ~e relative deviation (PtfFVt)- 1 of the market price Pt from the theon:t· 
Ical frur value FV t of a CLN in t. The corresponding panel regression is shown 1fl (4.10): 
ACLN;z = ßo + rßl +MAT;tß2 + NoR;ß3 + CR;ß4 +CT;ßs + v; +eit· (4.10) 
For the calculation of the theoretical fair value FV 
1
, we used recovery rates of 
40% and ~-8%, respectively, for both the CLN contracts and the CDSs, which served 
as the basis for the estimation of the default probabilities. Finally, we repeated the 
robustness check with a recovery rate of 40% and an estimated asset correlation equal toO. 
The next section presents the data sources for testing the panel regression rnodels. 
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5 DATA SOURCES 
For our analysis, we identified six majorGerman CLN issuers (two issuers more than 
in the paper of Rathgeber and Wang (2011)):4 
• Commerzbank AG (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang); 
• Deutsche Bank AG (additional issuer); 
• DZ Bank AG (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang); 
• Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang); 
• Landesbank Berlin (additional issuer); 
• UniCredit Group (analogous to Rathgeber and Wang). 
The following data had to be obtained from each CLN contract to meet the 
requirements of our model: 
• payment dates, including the final payment day; 
• coupon rate, coupon type and payment structure; 
• issue price and issuer; 
• underlying reference entities; 
• market prices of trading days with positive trading volume. 
Except for the different product names given by the specific issuers, all of these C~N 
Products are constructed similarly. They only differ from one another in the followmg 
aspects: 
• number of reference entities, single or multiple; 
• type of reference entities, corporate or national sovereign; 
• coupon type, fixed rate or variable rate (fioating rate or a mix of fixed and 
variable); 
• payment structure, periodic or only at maturity; 
•• tssue price and final payment at, under or over par. 
4 .ble 
di~ogous to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we used dummY variables to evaluate posSt 
erences among the credit risk of the issuers. 
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Altogether, we observed ninety CLN products issued fromApril1, 2008 to February 
27, 2012, covering 13 555 quoted market prices on a daily basis and correlated to a 
positive trading volume (we excluded some of the 136 CLN products from Rathgeber 
and Wang (2011) because the data required for our modelwas not available). Prices 
for days that bad a trading volume equal to 0 were ex ante excluded and are not part 
of our 13 555 quoted prices spanning the data sample. The CLN data of the different 
CLNs were obtained from the individual product descriptions, which were retrieved 
from the issuers' homepages. The daily market prices and the corresponding trading 
volumes were retrieved from the European Warrant Exchange Stuttgart (EUWAX).5 
Table 1 on the facing page shows the descriptive statistics on the ninety different CLN 
contracts used in our analysis. At the same time, the descriptive statistics show that 
the composition of the data sample used in the paper at band is comparable to that 
used by Rathgeber and Wang (2011). 
The descriptive statistics (Table 2 on page 61) of the implicit recovery rates of 
the CLNs show that 4021 of the quoted prices (which is 29.66% of the entire data 
sample) implied a recovery rate of 40% or high er. In comparison, the recovery rate 
of a (fair priced) senior CDS is 40%, and the recoveryrate of a Lehman-referenced 
CLN during the financial crisis was only 8.8%. The highest implicit recoveryrate in 
the sample was 163.72%. Besides theserather high implicit recovery rates, we also 
observed 6041 quoted prices ( 44.57% ), implying negative recovery rates, with the 
lowest implicit recovery rate being -3115.30%. On average, we observed an implicit 
recoveryrate of -36.98%. 
Further, the descriptive statistics regarding the quoted prices of the CLN and the rel-
ative mispricing D.CLN t calculated using ( 4.4) and a recoveryrate of 8.8% show that 
none of the quoted prices were priced with their fair values. In fact, 8199 of the quoted 
prices (which is 60.5% ofthe entire data sample) showed a deviation between market 
price and fair value of more than 5%. Only 1396 quoted prices showed a deviation 
of less than 1% (which is 10.3% of the entire data sample). In total, 6876 (50.73%) 
of the quoted prices were overpriced, and 6679 ( 49.27%) of the quoted prices where 
unde~riced. The largest overpricing within the sample was 70.14% (observed for a 
CLN tssu~ by Commerzbank), and the largest underpricing was 30.76% (observ~ 
~or a CLN tssued by LandesbankBaden-Württemberg). The averagerelative mispnc-
mg D.CLNt in absolute terms within the observation period was 9.38%, ie, CLNs 
were on average 9.38% overpriced. Separated by issuers, Commerzbank, DZ Bank 
AG and ~~desbank Berlin showed the largest average mispricing at more than lO%. 
. In addition to the CLN data, input parameters are also needed to calculate vatues 
m accordance with our model. To discount the estimated cashflows for each date, 
we needed the risk-free Spot rate on a daily basis. The required parameters for the 
s We gratefully acknowledge the data provided to us by the EUWAX. 








lssuer Frequency issue 
Commerzbank AG 20 2006 
Deutsche Bank AG 21 2007 
DZBankAG 26 2008 
Landesbank BW 22 2009 
Landesbank Berlin 1 2010 
UniCredit Group 10 2011 
Type 
Coupon of 
type Frequency references 
Floating 23 Sovereign 
Mixed 12 Corporate 
i 
Fixed 64 
! All values in percent. 
~ 
' i ~ 
Frequency Maturity Frequency 
2 < 1 year 0 
3 1-3 years 3 






Frequency days Frequency 
16 1-10 64 
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calculation of the spot rates and discount factors were estimated by the German Centtal 
Bank using the Svensson method (Svensson 1994). 
The CDS spreads of the reference entities were retrieved through Thomson Reuters 
Datastream, which uses historical data from Credit Market Analysis (CMA) as a 
source. We used daily quoted closing rates of senior CDSs with maturities from one 
to ten years, which were available for most of our required reference entities since 
2008. 
To calculate the joint default probabilities for CLNs with multiple underlying ref-
erence entities, we needed their asset correlation. Therefore, for each underlying 
corporation, we used its daily stock return within the observation period of April!, 
2008 to February 27, 2012 (or shorter, if data was not available for the entire period). 
As a proxy for the correlations of national sovereigns, we took the major stock index 
of each underlying country and calculated the daily stock return. Following Rathgeber 
and Wang (20 11), we applied Merton 's model, because the credit risk of a sovereign is 
closely related to its economic development, which is represented by the sovereign's 
stock index. 
6 TESTSAND RESULTS 
6.1 Mispricing in the German CLN secondary market: base case 
Table 3 on page 62 presents the test results for the entire observation period based 00 
the panel regression model from (4.7). 
The parameter values were negative for date and coupon rate. According to the 
regression model, this result indicates that the implicit recovery rate decreased with 
an increasing couponrate (H5) and during the entire observation period (Hl). Forthe 
maturity (H3), the number of reference entities (H4) and the control variable "coupon 
type" values were positive. Therefore, according to the regression model, this means 
that the Ionger the maturity, the larger the number of reference entities, or the more 
complex the coupon type, the larger the implicit recovery rate. In all cases except 
the coupon rate, we observed highly significant results. The explanatory power ofthe 
CLN contract panelregressionwas 0.229. 
FUrther, the Hausman-Wu test statistic reported in Table 3 on page 62 distinc~Y 
~hows tha~ ~ random effects model is more appropriate than a fixed effeets mod~I. Tbi~ 
15 
unsurpnsmg for several reasons. First we are inspecting the time series of differen 
CLN · ' in s, as different CLNs have different characteristics· this is not accounted for 
the regression model according to ( 4. 7) eg asymmetric ;nformation regarding default 
prbbili' ' ' (lall 
00° a ties between the issuer (respectively, investor) and the reference entities 0 e 
rrov.:ers ). Consequently, this Ieads to different mispricings of different CLN s. At th 
same time, we expect to observe the same dependence structure on the independent 








TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics of quoted market prices, implicit recoveryrate (calculated by means of a multi-borrower Jarrow and Turnbull 
model with the quoted market price as CLN value, resolved for the recovery rate) and the relative mispricing (calculated by means of (4.4)). 
Relative mispricing A. CLN, (recovery rate 8.8"/o) 
%of lmpliclt recovery rate Average, 
quoted absolute 
prices Average Min Max <0 >0.4 >5% <1% Average value Med Min Max so 
Overall 13555 -o.3698 -31.1530 1.6372 6041 4021 8199 1396 -o.0282 0.0938 0.0013 -o.3076 0.7014 0.1340 
lssuer 1: 2362 -0.1215 -10.6463 1.0853 987 761 1721 122 0.0392 0.1138 0.0128 -o.2401 0.7014 0.1583 
Commerzbank AG 
lssuer2: 12 -o.4498 -1.8454 0.2670 7 0 5 0 -o.0656 0.0702 -0.0190 -o.2274 0.0277 0.0801 
Deutsche Bank AG 
lssuer3: 4355 -o.2062 -16.1531 1.6372 1892 1449 2976 330 0.0572 0.1232 0.0054 -o.2821 0.5863 0.1635 
DZBankAG 
lssuer4: 5087 -o.3776 -31.1530 1.0350 2269 1266 2512 762 0.0073 0.0624 0.0009 -o.3076 0.5406 0.0859 
Landesbank Baden-
WOrttarnberg 
lssuer5: 540 -o.1040 -10.8750 1.3718 112 419 474 7 0.1108 0.1369 0.1373 -o.1462 0.4673 0.1160 
Landesbank Bet1in 
lssuer6: 1199 -1.5386 -26.4323 1.1863 774 126 510 171 -o.0467 0.0616 -0.0232 -o.2785 0.1034 0.0726 
UniCredlt Group 
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( -1 093.200) 
a1 (r) -2.000*** 
(-213.400) 
a2 (MAT) 13.993*** 
(98.400) 
a3 (NoR) 4.130*** 
(822.200) 
a4 (CR) -191.968 
(-1.300) 




Adjusted R2 0.229 
Values are for regression coefficients a0 , a1, a2, a3 , a4 , a5, Durbin-Watson test statistic (before ~!~i~-~~:~: 
estimation), Hausman-Wu test statistic and explanatory power R2 (values in brackets are t-values; SIQnl 
atthe 0.1% Ievei; '*significance at the 1% Ievei; *significance at the 5% Ievei). 
variables, which are stationary in time but at different levels. Interestingly, these 
levels are not fixed but random instead. The latter can be explained by the fact that 
these characteristics resulting in different levels are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables and not constant in time. 
To account for dynamic effects, we also tried to estimate a panel regression with 
yearly effects. However, the CLN specific effects clearly dominated the model. In 
addition to that, due to the autocorrelation and the applied Prais-Winsten estimati~n, 
we estimated the equations in differences, which additionally reduced the potenual 
inftuences of lagged variables. 
6.2 Mispricing during and after the financial crisis 
To test hypothesis H2 and, thus, CLN mispricing during and after the financial crisis, 
our first step was to conduct two further panel regressions: one with CLN data before 
May 8, 2009 and one after May 8, 2009. This date was selected because the European 
Central Bank performed the last reduction of the key interest rate with respect to ~e 
fi 'al · · M ult ofthts nanct cnsts on ay 7, 2009. Table 4 on the facing page presents the res 8 
regression. 
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TABLE 4 . Results for the panel regressions regarding the implicit recovery rate during and 
alter the fmancial crisis. 
Du ring After 
financial crisis financial crisis 
(April1, 2008- (May 8, 2009-
May 7, 2009) February 27, 2012) 
ao 0.169*** -1.379*** 
(53.215) (-1022.400) 
a1 (<) 0.030 -2.106*** 
(0.068) (-151.300) 
a2 (MAT) 6.896* 14.073*** 
(1.679) (1 01.000) 
aa (NoR) 1.045*** 4.610*** 
(32.997) (798.300) 
a4 (CR) -222.543 -194.226 
(-0.112) (-1.200) 
as (CT) 9.501*** 17.691 *** 
(12.041) (203.900) 
Durbin-Watson 0.149 0.227 
Hausman-Wu 0.321 5.044 
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.225 
Values are for th · · · · · · w· estimat' e regress1on coef11C1ents a0 , a1, a2, a3 , a4, a6, Ourbin-Watson test stat1st1c (before Pra1s-. 1nsten 
at the 01~~~ 1Hau~'!la.n-~u lest statistic and explanatory power R2 (values in brackets are t-values; ***signiflcanC8 · evel, Slgmf1cance at the 1% Ievei; *significance at the 5% Ievei). 
Highly significant results were obtained, particularly after the financial crisis, at 
her
least at the 0.1% Ievel, in all cases except for the coupon rate. For the maturity, the num-
ofre~ · · · · erence enttues and the control variable coupon type, we observed postuve 
values during and after the financial crisis indicating an increasing implicit recovery 
rate with an · · ' · · d · as . mcreasmg maturity, increasing nurober of reference enuues an mcre -
~C~l ' d. P extty of the CLN. We observed negative values for the coupon rate unng 
:: after the financial crisis, indicating that in both periods the implicit recovery rate 
reased with increasing coupon rate. These findings are in line with the CLN panel 
regressio · a1 h d diij n prevtously shown in Table 3 on the facing page. The parameter v ues a 
. erent signs during and after the financial crisis onl y for the date, indicating that the 
unpüc't 'al · · bu 1 recoveryrate increased (statistically not significant) during the financt cnsts 
fin~~eased (statistically significant) afterwards. The explanatory power during ~e 
Ctal crisis was 0.287 and thus ht'gher than in the CLN contract panel regresston 
PfeVi ' ' 
0 225
ously shown in Table 3. After the financial crisis, the explanatory power ';as 
fro and was therefore almost on the level of the CLN contract panel regresston 
111 Table 3. -
!tfWw.o~ .... 1'\at/1 ·-...... ,ournal 
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TABLE 5 Results for the panel regression with a dummy for the period after the financial 
crisis. 























. . (b 1 Prais-Winsten Values are forthe regression coefficients a0 , a1o a2 , a3 , a4 , a5, Durbin-Watson test statlstlc e or~ ••• . .ficance 
estimation), Hausman-Wu test statistic and explanatory power R2 (values in brackets are t-value, 919"' 
atthe 0.1% Ievei; **significance at the 1% Ievei; *significance at the 5% Ievei). 
In a second step, we tested whether the mispricing of CLNs was signific~tly 
different during and after the financial crisis by conducting a Chow test, accordmg 
to Chow (1960). The null hypothesis was that the mispricing of CLNs during the 
financial crisis was equal to the mispricing of CLNs after the financial crisis. The 
results of the Chow test at a 0.99 confidence Ievel rejected the null hypothesis. Hence, 
the Chow test is an indicator that the mispricing of CLNs did significantly change 
through the financial crisis. 
Because only thirty-five of the ninety CLNs in our data sample contain quoted 
prices during the financial crisis (2545 out of 13 555 quoted prices), the Cho": test 
may only be convincing to a limited extent. Thus, our third step involved conducung a 
further panel regression including a dummy variable for the financial crisis, wherebY 
the dummy was equal to 1 for dates after the financial crisis and 0 otherwise. The date 
variable had to be excluded, given high autocorrelation with the dummy variable. In 
this case, we ( once again) obtained highly significant results for all variables except 
the coupon rate. The explanatory power was 0.224. . 
The financial crisis dummy parameter showed a highly significant negative StgD• 
indicating that the implicit recovery rate decreased to a highly significant extent 
after the financial crisis. In line with the positive result of the Chow test, this result 
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provides further evidence for the existence of two structurally different regimes: one 
during the financial crisis and one after the financial crisis. The remaining parameters 
indicated the same sign as in the CLN panel regression, previously shown in Table 3 
on page 62, ie, the implicit recoveryrate and, thus, the mispricing of CLNs decreased 
with an increasing coupon rate but increased with increasing maturity, an increasing 
number of reference entities and an increasing CLN complexity. 
6.3 Robustness check 
To check the robustness of these results, we conducted six robustness checks. For three 
of the robustness checks, we applied the same procedure as previously described with 
alternative recovery rates of 8.8% and 60% for the CDSs, which served as a basis for 
the estimation ofthedefault probabilities. (As mentioned above, in the base case, we 
assumed a CDS recoveryrate of 40%.) In another robustness check, we applied the 
same procedure as previously shown but assumed an asset correlation ofO (and a CDS 
recoveryrate of 40% analogous to the base case). During the remaining three robust-
ness checks, we repeated the aforementioned regression with the relative mispricing 
according to (4.4) as dependent variable and different recovery rates (respectively, 
an asset correlation equal to 0). Table 6 on the next page shows the results for the 
robustness checks with altemating recovery rates and an asset correlation equal to 0· 
Table 6 on the next page shows that almost all of the results of the base case were 
robust against changes within the assumed recovery rate: regarding the CLN panel 
regression and the regression with the crisis dummy, all results from the base case 
were confirmed within these three robustness checks. The results of the base case were 
also confirmed during and after the financial crisis for an altemating CDS recovery 
rate of 8.8%. For a recovery rate of 60% as well as an asset correlation equal 0• 
all Parameters were analogous to the base case except for the date variable during 
the crisis. In both cases, in contrast to the base case, the implicit recovery rate also 
decreased during the crisis and not only after the crisis. Further, the robustness checks 
had no impact on the significance of the results from the base case. . 
Addi · · · 1 · nus-. . tionally, we repeated the aforementioned regresston wtth the re auve :cmg as dependent variable (4.10). Thereby, the relative mispricing was calculated 
. cording to (4.9). We further considered different recovery rates of 8.8% (respec· 
tively, 40%) for the calculation of the CLN as well as CDS for the estimation of 
the default probability. In a separate robustness check, we further assumed an asset 
corrh elation equal 0. Table 7 on page 68 shows the results of these three robustneSS 
c ecks. 
Tabl · · 'ein as dePen e 7 00 page 68 shows that the robustness checks with the relanve mtspn g 
all dent variable confirms the results of the aforementioned regressions in am::t 
cases. The two major differences are the reversed signs for the couponrate and e 
66 M. Walter et al 
TABLE 6 Results for the robustnass checks with alternating CDS recovery rates for the 
estimation of the default probabilities and an asset correlation equal to 0. [fable continues 
on next page.] 
(a) Recovery rate 8.8% 
Entire Du ring After Dummy 
period crisis crisis regression 
ao -2.024*** 0.071*** -2247*** -2.563*** 
(-1769.4) (22.892) (-1626.6) (-2838.6} 
a1 -3.228*** 0.276 -3.618*** -0.496*** ( rlpost-crisis dummy) (-359.6} (0.621} (-268.900) (-923.4} a2 (MAT) 23.443*** 7.488* 24.151 *** 26.198*** 
(172.2} (1.772) (180.6) (209.0} a3 (NoR) 5.128*** 1.174*** 5.696*** 4.904*** 
(1079.5} (35.944) (1040.0) (1046.5} a4 (CR) -255.385 -253.580 -249.029 -305243 
(-1.3) (-0.124) (-1.4) (-1.5} as (CT) 23.024*** 11.368*** 24.227*** 22.972*** 
(299.4) (13.939) (294.7) (296.0} Durbin-Watson 0.208 0.147 0.219 0200 Hausman-Wu 24.988 1.493 15.096 9.172 Adjusted R2 
0216 0.291 0.211 0208 
(b) Recovery rate 60% 
Entire Du ring After Dummy period crisis crisis regression 
ao 
-0.722*** 0.217*** -0.842*** -0.913*** 
(-686.724) (66.216) (-665.247) (-1085.3} a1 
-1282*** -0.148 -1.165*** -0263*** (-r/post-crisis dummy) (-122.472) (-0.346) (-76.694) (-491.6) a2 (MAT) 
7.946*** 6.502* 7.605*** 8.850*** 
a3 (NoR) 
(49.928) (1.649) (48.909) (61.5) 
3.735*** 0.975*** 4.184*** 3.664*** 
a4 (CR) (643.017) (32.170) (630.315) (636.7) 
-163.120* -203.115 -172.654* -165.646 
as (CT) (-1.721) (-0.107) (-1.933) (-12) 
14.362*** 8.388*** 14.274*** 14219*** 
Durbin-Watson 
(152.445) (11.149) (142.679) (146.900) 
Hausman-Wu 0210 0.152 0.224 0206 
Adjusted R2 2.003 0.135 1.516 1.773 
0230 0.282 0.230 0229 -
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TABLE 6 Continued. 
(c) Asset correlation = 0 
Entire Du ring After Dummy 
period crisis crisis regreaslon 
ao -1.171 *** 0.222*** -1.332*** -1.509*** 
(-1056.1) (72.978) (-994.916) (-1715.3) 
a1 (r/post-crisis dummy) -2.115*** -0.350 -2211*** -0.355*** 
(-222.3) (-0.769) (-157.152) (-663.3) 
a2 (MAT) 13.764*** 5.255 13.922*** 15.486*** 
(95.3) (1.194) (98.582) (117.3) 
aa (NoR) 4.343*** 1.203*** 4.805*** 4202*** 
a4 (CR) 
(847.800) (35.243) (818.346) (831.1) 
-195.127 -201.182 -196.940** -229260* 
as (CT) 
(-1.3) (-0.094) (-2.488) (-1.8) 
16.972*** 9.001 *** 17.447*** 16.869*** 
Durbin-Watson 
(204.500) (10.529) (197.669) (201.3) 
0215 0.150 0.227 0208 
Hausman-Wu 8.350 0.177 5.602 3.767 
Adjusted R2 0.229 0.251 0226 0222 





au~~a.n-~u lest statistic and explanatory power R2 (values in brackets ane t-values; ***signlllcanC8 
· evel, stgnl!tcance at the 1% Ievei; *signilicance at the 5% Ievei). 
maturity.: in the case of the coupon rate, we observe positive signs in each case except 
the relativ · · · 40% · d' . e mtspncmg during the crisis in the case of a recovery rate of ' m l-
Cating an increasing mispricing with increasing coupon rate. In the case of maturity, 
;e obs~rved negative signs in each case, indicating an increasing mispricing with 
ecreasmg maturity. We further observed smaller explanatory powers than in the base 
case, espec · all . 1 Y m the case of a recovery rate of 40%. 
6·4 Discussion of results 
Overall, consolidating the base case and the robustness checks Ieads to the conclusion 
that all of . · ) erified . our hypotheses except H5 (regarding the first stght effect are v 
Statistically. 
b 
Our first hypothesis H 1 is based on the idea that CLN markets are characterized 
y~ . 'gnifi . ng tnforrnation asymmetry not least due to the fact that banks have a 81 -
cantmt · ' . , · · (Sb orrnatton advantage regarding borrower's, ie, reference enutY s, c~ctensucs 
arpe 1990). These informatien asymmetries and the resulting overpncmg of CLN 
COntracts on an overall market Ievel ought to decrease over the course of time due to 
't#Ww.rlak.netiJoumat 
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TABLE 7 Results for the robustnass checks with the relative mispricing as dependent 
variable, using different recovery rates as weil as an asset correlation equal to 0. [fable 
continues on next page.] 
(a) Relative mispricing as dependent variable (recovery rate 8.8%) 
Entire Du ring After Dummy 
period crisis crisis regression 
ßo 0.020*** -0.003 -0.020*** -0.056*** 
(12.423) (-0.744) (-46.478) (-121.002) 
ß1 (rlpost-crisis dummy) -0.441 -0.072 -0.411*** 0.014*** 
(-0.418) (-0.171) (-6.298) (27.212) 
ß2 (MAT) -0.730 -0.374** -0.356*** -0.118*** 
(-1.149) (-2.670) (-6.198) (-6.145) 
ß3 (NoR) 0.460*** 0.248*** 0.747*** 0.646*** 
(4.329) (11251) (12.577) (20.193) 
ß4 (CR) 19.311 12.065 35.122 21.161 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.043) (0.054) 
ßs (CT) 3.433 1.712*** 1.095 1.512** 
(1.345) (3.601) (1.126) (2.768) 
Durbin-Watson 0.100 0.196 0.082 0.104 Hausman-Wu 5.916 0.840 4.735 2.548 Adjusted R2 0.230 0.320 0.094 0.125 
(b) Relative mispricing as dependent variable (recovery rate 40%) 
Entire Du ring After Dummy 
period crisis crisis regression 
ßo 
-0.089*** -0.069 -0.054*** -0.085*** 
ß1 (r/post-crisis dummy) 
(-122.607) (-13.832) (-90.531) (-142.776) 
-0.004 -0277 -0.129*** -0.017*** 
ß2 (MAT) 
(-0.171) (-0.739) (-3.128) (-30.936) 
-0.107*** -0.077 -0.168*** -0.082*** 
ß3 (NoR) 
(-5.674) (-0.649) (-5.127) (-5.835) 
0.358*** 0.165*** 0.468*** 0.368*** 
ß4 (CR) 
(25.539) (8.999) (14.967) (23.933) 
9.422 -3.797 4.836 8265 
ßs (CT) 
(0.042) (-0.003) (0.012) (0.038) 
1.516*** 1.491*** 1.487** 1.613*** 
Durbin-Watson 
(6.650) (3.786) (2.960) (6.172) 
Hausman-Wu 
0.131 0234 0.109 0.134 
Adjusted R2 2.761 2.166 6.246 1.534 
0.154 0273 0.108 0.154 
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TABLE 7 Continued. 
(c) Relative mispricing as dependent variable (asset correlation = 0) 
Entire Du ring After 
Dummy 
period crisis crisis 
regreasion 
ßo -0.032*** 
-0.046*** -0.046*** -0.084*** 
ß1 (rlpost-crisis dummy) 
(-14.648) (-9243) (-84.260) 
(-147.143) 
-0.545 -0.392 -0.238*** 
-0.008*** 
ß2 (MAT) 
(-0.690) (-1.035) (-5.173) 
(-14.431) 
-0.437 -0233* -0.248*** 
-0.113*** 
ßa (NoR) 
(-1.088) (-1.937) (-6.624) 
(-7.476) 
0.375*** 0226*** 0.607*** 
0.505*** 
ß4 (CR) 
(5.653) (12.049) (16.576) 
(28.600) 
7.531 5.689 10.535 
9.103 
ßs (CT) 









Hausman-Wu 3.405 1.562 
6.727 1.677 
0.171 
Adjusted R2 0.230 0291 
0.123 





~~ ~au~',!!8~~u lest statistic, and explanatory power R2 (values in brackets are t-vslues; s1gnificance 
evel, slgnlflcance at the 1% Ievel; •significance at the 5% Ievel). 
an ~creasing "body of knowledge". We can confirm H1 during the entire observation :•od from 2008 to 2012, using the implicit recoveryrate as proxy for tbe .....,, 
nuspncmg. Accordingly, irrespective of the maturity of single CLN contracts, the 
overpricing of CLN s decreased in our data sample. This perception coincides with the 
recent 'd evt ence of McLean and Pontiff (2016) who postulate that academic research 
COntrib ' 
1 
utes to decrease market anomalies . 
. ~ a second step, hypothesis H2 examined the intluence of the 2007-9 financial 
cnsts on the mispricing of CLN s in more detail. In essence, we argued that due to 
a tremend · · · 'th th · m· g 
1 
ous mcrease m the number of researcb papers dealing W1 e pnc 
~'~ctored financial products alter 20IJI, and due to a stroJII\ef regulation of tbe 
~al market, especially for credit derivatives, inf()rtlllllion asymmetrY Wtdlin ~ 
market declined. We operationalized H2 by separatelY analyzing the unpllctt 
recovery 'al · · In 
d . rate (respectively, the m!spricing) durlog and alter tbe finaDC1 CRSIS· . ~g so, we observe a statistically significant decrease of mispricing aftet the finanClal 
:"~· In."?"""'t, durlng the crisis, we observe a (statistically not signiJicaDil _.., 
h
lllispncmg. This fi.nding is basically in line with for example, WoJtOWlCZ (2°
14
), 
w o sta ' fthe ted that, as of today, bounded rational investors are increasingly aware 
0 
70 M. Walter et al 
underlying risks of structured financial products; thus, issuers are no Ionger able to 
overprice their products to the same extent as they did before or during the crisis. 
Hence, although it may also be conceivable that mispricing increased due to the 
financial crisis because of a shift toward a market full of "informed experts", we obtain 
the result that we ex ante consider to be logical. Moreover, our finding regarding the 
effect of the financial crisis is robust as both a Chow test and a further regression 
with a dummy variable for the time after the financial crisis confirm the result that 
mispricing decreased to a significant extent after the financial crisis. This provides 
evidence for a structural break due to the crisis. 
The third key hypothesis in our study, H3, examined the pricing of CLNs not on 
an aggregated market Ievel but on a contract Ievel instead. In particular, we analyzed 
whether the mispricing is correlated to the time to maturity. We confirm H3 for the 
entire observation period from 2008 to 2012 as weil as in the cases of two identified 
regimes ( during and after the crisis ). In all cases, we observed an increase in overpric-
ing with decreasing maturity. This result strengthens the assumption that infonnation 
asymmetry between the issuer and the investor decreases with decreasing time to 
maturity, which is basically in line with Longstaff et al (2005). Further, this result 
is in line with the findings of, for example, Chen and Sears (1990), Stoimenov and 
Wilkens (2005) or Baule (2011 ), thus providing evidence for the existence of a product 
life cycle. Our results not only confirm existing contributions in this field of research 
but also put them on a broader basis, as the data sample for this paper covers manY 
mo~e data points (13 555) and a Ionger period (eg, Baule (2011) only analyzed ~~ 
penod from November 2006 to December 2007). As a restriction, we have to pom 
?ut that in the case of relative mispricing as the dependent variable, we observ~d an 
mverse product life cycle with an increase in mispricing with decreasing matunty. 
. Regar~ng the complexity of CLN products (which in turn also contributes .10 
mformauon asymmetry), we confirm hypothesis H4: the overpricing increases wtth 
. . l 
an mcreasmg number of reference entities. The same result is observed for the contro 
variable coupon type, ie, the complexity of the coupon structure. Thus, the two cases 
confirm -~e findings of Rathgeber and Wang (20 11 ). . 
Surpnsmgly, Hypothesis H5 regarding the first sight effect has to be rejected 111 
almost all of our tests ( except the robustness checks with the relative rnispricing as 
the dependent variable). We hypothesized that the overpricing increases with higher 
coupon~. In fact, our finding contrasts the findings ofRathgeber and Wang (2011) and 
Wallmeter and Diethelm (2009). One reason for this contradictory and unpredicted 
r~sult may be the aforementioned higher awareness of investors ofthe high underlying 
nsks ~f structured financial products after the financial crisis, which is amplified by 
l
the hi~ number of academic and public coverage. Thus a high coupon nüght 00 
onger mduce · · ' ~ the . . a postttve first sight effect but rather put the investor on alert 10r 
inherent nsk structure. 
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To summarize, our results provide evidence that the CLN market generally shows 
a decrease in overpricing over the course of time. In particular, the overpricing of 
CLN during and after the financial crisis changed significantly, to the effect that the 
overpricing decreased to a more significant extent after the crisis, which is in line with 
our expectations based on existing literature. Another interesting contribution to the 
Iiterature is the fact that Rathgeber and Wang (2011) only observed overpricing on 
the date of issue. We have now identified that the majority of the 13 555 quoted prices 
were actually underpriced instead of overpriced, showing (highly) negative implied 
recovery rates. 
7 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
The market for structured financial products has grown in the past few years. Hence, a 
significant number of studies have analyzed the pricing of these products. This paper 
significantly extended the contribution of Rathgeber and Wang (2011): we analyzed 
whether CLN contracts are priced with their fair value not only on their date of issue 
but also during their life cycle. Thereby, our analysis was based on a widespread data 
~ample covering 13 555 daily quoted prices of ninety CLN contracts from five major 
tssuers in the German market. This is also a significant extension of Rathgeber and 
Wang (2011). Analogous to Rathgeber and Wang (2011), we applied a market-based 
valuation model for the calculation of the fair value of CLNs. This approacb is based 
on the reduced model by J arrow and TurnbuH ( 1995) and Jarrow et al ( 1997}, extended 
by the single-factor Merton model to estimate the joint default probabilities by means 
of asset correlations. For the derivation of the default probabilities, we used the CDS 
spreads of the underlying entities. 
theOne of the major findings of this paper is that CLNs arenot only ov~rpriced ~n 
secondary market but also often underpriced to a large extent. This result 18 
rather surprising in view of the fact that Rathgeber and Wang (2011) only observed 
ove · . .. rpnced CLN products on their issue date. Further, we discovered that overpncmg 
~LNs significantly decreased after the 2007-9 financial crisis due to a decrease in 
:onnation asymmetry, although CLN markets are gradually recovering, and demand 
structured products is still high. This result is also robust for changes in recov~ry 
rates 0~ correlation coefficients. The theory of the product life cycle, ie, decreas~g 
:erpncing with decreasing maturity, was confirmed as well as the positive correla~on 
tween the complexity of the CLN product and the mispricing. Tbe latter finding 
~t Only confirms but also strengthens the corresponding finding of Rathgeber and 
s ang. (~Oll) because of the extended and widespread data sample used in this paper. 
hillrprismgly, the common theory of the first sight effect, ie, an investor's focus ~ a 
:hicoupon rate in expectation of a high return instead of the bidden factors behind 
gh Coupon rate, bad to be rejected. 
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Based on the results of our paper, a few possibilities exist to extend our work. 
Although our data sample is quite large, with 13 555 quoted prices, it does not begin 
until April 2008. Thus, the data sample contains data during the financial crisis and 
after the financial crisis, but not prior to the financial crisis. By extending the data 
sample with data prior to the financial crisis, we would also be able to analyze CLN 
mispricing before the crisis. Moreover, the change in interest rates is modeled more 
specifically to more accurately calculate fair prices for CLNs with fioating coupon 
payments. Further, the valuation framework may be used for CLN products issued 
on CLN markets other than the German market to test whether these hypotheses are 
universally valid. 
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